BLOG DIRECTORY, Submit blog free, Promote Blog, Best directory

Monday, December 27, 2010

Case law:Court finds Hartford reliance on paper review of medical documentation by a physican grounds for 'Arbitrary and Capricious'

This is the text of a related case that seeks to recover plaintiff's attorney fees. The plaintiff prevailed. However, the case mentions that
"This Court held that Hartford’s decision to deny Bowers’s application for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits was “arbitrary and capricious” based on: (1) Hartford’s conflict of interest in determining whether Bowers was eligible for benefits and when, if ever, benefits should be paid; (2) the failure of Hartford’s medical reviewer to document upon which evidence he rested his decision that Bowers is not disabled; (3) the failure of Hartford’s medical reviewer to consider all evidence, specifically, the Functional Capacity Evaluation, when finding a lack of clinical data documenting Bowers’s disability; and (4) Hartford’s failure to consider the actual requirements of Bowers’s occupation and the circumstances surrounding the Occupational Analysis."




IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CONNIE BOWERS, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:09-CV-290
:
v. : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
:
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT : Magistrate Judge King
INSURANCE COMPANY :
:
Defendant. :
:
OPINION & ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff, Connie Bowers’s (“Bowers”) Motion for
Attorney’s Fees. (Doc. 38). Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), Bowers seeks an award of
$23,590.00 in attorney’s fees and $445.98 in costs. For the reasons set forth below, Bowers’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2010, this Court issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant Hartford Life
and Accident Insurance Co.’s (“Hartford”) Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and
granting in part Bowers’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. 29). This Court
held that Hartford’s decision to deny Bowers’s application for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits
was “arbitrary and capricious” based on: (1) Hartford’s conflict of interest in determining whether
Bowers was eligible for benefits and when, if ever, benefits should be paid; (2) the failure of
Hartford’s medical reviewer to document upon which evidence he rested his decision that Bowers
is not disabled; (3) the failure of Hartford’s medical reviewer to consider all evidence, specifically,
the Functional Capacity Evaluation, when finding a lack of clinical data documenting Bowers’s
disability; and (4) Hartford’s failure to consider the actual requirements of Bowers’s occupation and
the circumstances surrounding the Occupational Analysis. Bowers v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co.,
No. 2:09-CV-290, 2010 WL 1963412, at *9 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2010) (“Bowers I”).1
Based on its finding that Hartford’s denial of Bowers’s LTD benefits was arbitrary and
capricious, this Court remanded the case to the Plan Administrator to determine whether Bowers’s
physical limitations rendered her unable to perform her previous duties as a Senior General Office
Administrator with Kenworth. Id. at *9. Bowers then moved this Court for reconsideration of the
remedy. Bowers argued: (1) that the Court should have ordered a retroactive reinstatement of
benefits, rather than remand the case to the Plan Administrator, and (2) that the Court should have
ordered Hartford to pay pre-judgment interest on the retroactive award. Because remand was a
proper remedy for Bowers’s claim, this Court denied Bowers’s Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment. While Bowers’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was pending, Bowers filed a
Motion for Attorney’s Fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). That motion is now before the Court.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In most lawsuits seeking relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs’ are available ‘to either party’ at the court’s
‘discretion.’” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins., --- U.S. ---, ---, 120 S.Ct. 2149, 2152 (2010)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)) (citation omitted). Though the language of the statute is silent
1 For clarity and convenience, the Court’s initial Opinion & Order in this case will be referred to
as “Bowers I,” while the Court’s Opinion & Order on Bowers’s Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment will be referred to as “Bowers II.”
2
regarding the degree of success a party must achieve in order to be eligible for an award of
attorney’s fees, in Hardt, the Supreme Court interpreted the language of § 1132(g)(1) to allow an
award of attorney’s fees “‘in its discretion’ . . . ‘to either party’ . . . as long as the fee claimant has
achieved ‘some degree of success on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S.
680, 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)). Additionally, the
Supreme Court cautioned against the use of factor tests to determine a claimant’s eligibility for
attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1). The Fourth Circuit’s five-factor test considered in Hardt is
identical to the King test utilized in this Circuit. Compare Hardt, ---U.S.---, 130 S.Ct. at 2155 n.1
(quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1029 (4th Cir. 1993) (setting out
the Fourth Circuit test)) and Gaeth, 538 F.3d at 529 (setting out the Sixth Circuit test). The Supreme
Court did not, however, “foreclose the possibility that once a claimant has satisfied this requirement
[some success on the merits], and thus becomes eligible for a fees award under § 1132(g)(1), a court
may consider the five factors adopted by the Court of Appeals . . . in deciding whether to award
attorney’s fees.” Hardt, --- U.S. ---, 130 S.Ct. at 2158 n.8. Hardt, therefore, adds a threshold
determination to a court’s analysis of a motion for fees under § 1132(g)(1). Once a court determines
that a claimant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits,” it may apply a factor test to
determine whether to award fees.
IV. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. HARDT ANALYSIS
Bowers’s eligibility for attorney’s fees and costs under § 1132(g)(1) turns on the question
of whether she has achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt, --- U.S.---, 130 S.Ct.
at 2158. The “some degree of success” standard is not satisfied if the claimant achieves only “trivial
3
success on the merits or a purely procedural victory, but [is satisfied] if the court can fairly call the
outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquiry into the
question whether a particular party’s success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). In Hardt, the Supreme Court expressly left open the question of
whether a remand order alone, without a finding regarding the plaintiff’s disability, constitutes
“some success on the merits.” Id. at 2159. Since Hardt, lower courts have determined that a remand
requiring the plan administrator to address deficiencies in the original review of a plaintiff’s claim
constitutes “some success on the merits” even if the district court made no determination regarding
the plaintiff’s disability status. See Richards v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:08-cv-279, 2010 WL
3219133 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding some success on the merits where the plaintiff
achieved a remand requiring the plan administrator to “address the many deficiencies that occurred
during review of Plaintiff’s claim,” and creating the possibility that the defendant plan administrator
might substantiate plaintiff’s disability). Thus, remand does not preclude a finding of “some success
on the merits.”2 Id.
In finding Hartford’s decision to terminate Bowers’s LTD benefits to be arbitrary and
capricious, this Court recognized serious deficiencies in Hartford’s review of Bowers’s claim. For
example, in the course of compiling the report that was the sole basis for Hartford’s denial of
Bowers’s LTD benefits, this Court found that Hartford’s medical reviewer did not examine Bowers,
properly acknowledge the opinions of Bowers’s treating physicians or take the Functional Capacity
Evaluation into account. On remand, Hartford will have to consider this evidence, which may lead
2 After this Court remanded Bowers’s claim, she filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
In that motion Bowers sought a retroactive reinstatement of her LTD benefits. The Court denied
Bowers’s motion finding that remand to the Plan Administrator was an appropriate remedy.
4
to a reinstatement of Bowers’ benefits. This Court, therefore, concludes Bowers has achieved
“some success on the merits” at this remand stage and is, therefore, eligible for attorney’s fees under
§ 1132(g)(1).
B. KING ANALYSIS
Bowers’s eligibility for attorney’s fees, however, does not establish her entitlement to them.
See Hardt, ---U.S. at ---, 130 S.Ct. at 2158 n.8 (“[O]nce a claimant . . . becomes eligible for a fees
award . . . a court may consider the five factors . . . in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees.”)
The factors of the King test must weigh in favor of an award of attorney’s fees before a district court
in this Circuit will exercise its discretion to grant such fees. See Kauffman, 2007 WL 490896 at *1.
The King factors are as follows: (1) the degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2)
the opposing party’s ability to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees; (3) the deterrent effect of an award
on other persons under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to confer
a common benefit on all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve significant legal
questions regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. Gaeth, 538 F.3d at
529. Because no single factor is determinative, the Court will consider each factor in turn. Moon v.
Unum Provident Corp., 461 F.3d 639, 642-43 (6th Cir. 2006).
1. Culpability or Bad Faith
This Court’s finding that Hartford’s denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious does not
mean that the denial was made in bad faith. Foltice v. Guardsman Products, Inc., 98 F.3d 933, 937
(6th Cir. 1996). Rather, “the Court considers the circumstances surrounding the denial,” in order to
determine the level of Defendant’s culpability or bad faith. Kauffman v. Sedalia Medical Center,
Inc., No. 204-CV-543, 2007 WL 490896, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2007). It is important to note that
5
culpability and bad faith are not synonymous—as is demonstrated by the disjunctive “or” in the King
test. See Pelchant v. Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 3:02CV7282, 2003 WL 21479170, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
June 25, 2006). “Culpability is merely defined as ‘blameworthiness.’” Pelchant, 2003 WL
21479170, at *2 n.1 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 385 (7th ed. 1999)). Bad faith, on the other
hand, has been defined by the Sixth Circuit as “arbitrary, reckless, indifferent, or intentional
disregard of the interests of the person owed a duty.” Benkert v. Medical Protective Co., 842 F.2d
144, 149 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Foltice, 98 F.3d at 940 (Wiseman, J., dissenting).
While this Court does not find Hartford’s decision was in bad faith, the evidence shows
Hartford was culpable in terminating Bowers’s LTD benefits. The Sixth Circuit has found that
“[w]here a plan administrator engages in an inadequate review of a beneficiary’s claim or otherwise
acts improperly in denying benefits,” the culpability aspect of the King test is satisfied. See Shelby
County Health Care Corp v. Majestic Star Casino, 581 F.3d 355, 377 (6th Cir. 2009). A paper
review that fails to take treating physicians’ opinions into account is an example of an inadequate
review. See Moon v. Unum Provident Corp., 461 F.3d 639, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing the
district court and weighing the culpability factor in favor of petitioner where the administrator’s
physician conducted only a paper review that failed to take into account treating physicians’
opinions). Hartford engaged in such an inadequate review of Bowers’s claim. Hartford’s
independent reviewer, Dr. Baum, failed to credit the opinions of Bowers’s treating physicians,
including the Functional Capacity Evaluation performed by Dr. Bonasso, and offered no reasons
for his failure to do so. Bowers I, 2010 WL 1963412 at *14-*16. While Hartford is not required to
give special deference to Bowers’s treating physicians, it “may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a
claimant’s treating physician.” Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003).
6
If the opinion of a treating physician is not credited, the plan administrator “must give reasons for
adopting an alternative opinion.” Williams v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., slip op. 2009 WL
3127761, at *10 (S.D. Ohio September 25, 2009) (citing Evans v. Unum Provident Corp., 434 F.3d
866, 877 (6th Cir. 2006)). Because Dr. Baum offered no such explanation as to why his view
differed from Bowers’ treating physicians’ opinion, Hartford, as the insurer did in Moon, engaged
in an inadequate review, which fulfills the culpability standard under the King analysis. Thus, this
Court finds that the first King factor weighs in favor of awarding attorney’s fees.
2. Hartford’s Ability to Satisfy an Award of Attorney’s Fees
Hartford does not dispute their ability to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees. See generally
(Def.’s Memo. Opp.). This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of such an award.
3. Deterrent Effect of a Fee Award
“The key question in analyzing this third factor is . . . whether the fee award [will] have a
deterrent effect on other plan administrators.” Gaeth, 538 F.3d at 532. The deterrent effect on other
plan administrators is likely to have more significance in a case where the defendant is highly
culpable—where “deliberate misconduct is in the offing,” rather than when the plan administrator
has just made an “honest mistake.” Foltice, 98 F.3d at 937. Lack of bad faith should not impact
whether a court finds fees could have a deterrent effect. Moon, 461 F.3d at 645.
In this case, Hartford’s benefits determination does fall within the category of
“misconduct”rather than just an “honest mistake.” Hartford’s plan administrator based its decision
to deny the Bowers’s benefits on the opinion of a medical reviewer who conducted a less than
thorough file review. As discussed earlier, a cursory review of a claimant’s file constitutes culpable
conduct. See Moon, 461 F.3d at 645. Thus, even in the absence of bad faith, an award of attorney’s
7
fees here can have a deterrent effect. Similar to the Sixth Circuits’s reasoning for awarding fees in
Moon, awarding Bowers fees will warn plan administrators that “before terminating a plan
participant’s benefits, a plan administrator should ensure that the opinions upon which they rely to
make their decisions are based on a thorough review of the administrative record.” Id. Thus, this
third King factor also weighs in favor of awarding attorneys fees.
4. Conferring a Common Benefit on Plan Participants or Resolving a Significant Legal
Question Under ERISA
Bowers admits that she filed this case for her own benefit. Accordingly, she has not sought
to confer a common benefit on other plan participants. Moon, 461 F.3d at 645. Additionally, no
significant ERISA legal question has been or will be resolved by this case. Bowers argues that her
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment presented a “novel and unresolved legal issue”: whether
Bowers should continue receiving benefits until Hartford determines Bowers’s eligibility for
benefits under the “any occupation” and the “own occupation” standards. This Court, however, did
not consider the question when ruling on the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment because it lacked
jurisdiction. Bowers v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., slip op., No. 2:09-CV-290, 6-7 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 24, 2010) (“Bowers II”). See also Smith v. Bayer Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 275
Fed. Appx. 495, 511 (6th Cir. 2008). This Court also noted that the case law cited by Bowers to
support her position that Hartford was required to perform an “any occupation” review prior to the
end of the “own occupation” period did not stand for such a proposition. Bowers II, No. 2:09-CV-
290 at 7. Thus, as Bowers’s case will not resolve any difficult ERISA questions, this factor weighs
against awarding attorney’s fees.
8
5. Relative Merits of the Parties’ Positions
In holding that Hartford’s denial of Bowers’s LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious, this
Court found that Bowers proved that the plan administrator’s decision-making process in denying
her LTD benefits was inadequate. Rather than reinstating her benefits, however, this Court remanded
the case to Hartford’s plan administrator to re-examine Bowers’s eligibility for LTD benefits.
Bowers, 2010 WL 1963412 at *8-*9. See Bowers II, No. 2:09-CV-290 at 4, 5. It is entirely possible,
therefore, that upon reexamination, the plan administrator again will determine that Bowers is not
entitled to benefits under the plan. When the record leaves open the possibility that the plan
administrator might ultimately prevail, the merits of the claimant’s position are questionable as
compared to the merits of the plan administrator’s. See Gaeth, 538 F.3d at 534. This factor,
therefore, favors Hartford and weighs against awarding attorney’s fees.
6. Summary
None of the factors examined above is alone dispositive. See Foltice, 98 F.3d at 937. The
factors, do, however, inform the discretion of this Court. See id. at 936 (“When exercising the
discretion vested in the district court by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), we have said, the district court
should consider the [King] factors . . .”). On balance, three factors weigh in favor of awarding
attorneys fees, and two weigh against. Considering these King factors in light of the evidence on the
record, this Court awards reasonable costs and attorney’s fees to Bowers.
V. REASONABLENESS OF FEES
The starting point for determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees is the “lodestar”
amount. Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). This is calculated
by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
9
rate. Id. “Where the party seeking attorney fees has established that the number of hours and the rate
claimed are reasonable, the lodestar is presumed to be the reasonable fee to which counsel is
entitled.” Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088,
92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986).
A. Hours Reasonable Expended
In determining the hours reasonable expended by a prevailing party’s counsel,
[t]he question is not whether a party prevailed on a particular motion or whether in
hindsight the time expenditure was strictly necessary to obtain the relief requested.
Rather, the standard is whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work
to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work
was performed.
Woolridge v. Marlene Indus. corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir. 1990). Bowers submits that 67.4
hours were reasonably expended by her counsel on this case. Defendants have not objected to the
hours Bowers has claimed. After reviewing counsel’s billing records, the Court finds these hours
reasonable.
B. Reasonable Hourly Rates
Bowers suggests that a reasonable rate in this case is $350 per hour. Bower’s counsel’s
affidavit establishes counsel’s work experience in the ERISA field to justify the rate requested. The
affidavit further established that the market supports the rate requested in this case—Bower’s
counsel has previously worked on other cases at a rate of $350 per hour. Finally, the affidavit sets
out a range of fees that have been approved in this Circuit, ranging from $350 per hour to $550 per
hour, based on the complexity of the work and the experience of the attorney. Defendants have not
objected to the rate Bowers has claimed. This Court finds, based on the above cited reasons, that
$350 per hour is a reasonable rate. As of the time the Motion for Attorney’s Fees was filed, per the
10
affidavit of Plaintiff’s counsel, the total amount of fees incurred was $23,590.00, and the total
amount of costs incurred was $445.98 for a total of $24,035.98. This is a reasonable award in this
case.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Court finds Plaintiff Bowers is eligible for attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
because she has achieved more than trivial success on the merits of her claim. This Court also finds
the King factors weigh in favor of awarding Bowers’s requested attorney’s fees, which are
reasonable with regard to the number of hours and rate requested. Therefore, Bowers’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to pay Bowers the requested fees and
costs of $24,035.98.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Algenon L. Marbley
Algenon L. Marbley
United States District Judge
Dated: October 19, 2010
11




Sunday, December 26, 2010

If plaintiff loses the case against LTD insurance carrier, should she also pay her LTD carrier's attorney fees?

Here is an instance in which Aetna won the case against plaintiff because of the application of 'arbitrary and capricious' standard. Aetna also wanted the attorney's fees to be paid which was denied by the court because the court did not find any harassment of the carrier by the plaintiff

Are you a physician? Here is why you should consider not taking ERISA disability insurance

This article cogently explains the pitfall of ERISA for physicians. One wonders what kind of disability insurance he physicians hired by the LTD carriers take. I wish that was allowed in discovery.
Here is a relevant snippet from the article
"

Do you have group long-term disability coverage that pays you if you become disabled? If you get sick or hurt, are you relying on that group LTD policy to pay you benefits? If you do, don’t count on it. There are three primary reasons for this: (1) inferior contract language, (2) ERISA, and (3) relevant court decisions. If you become disabled, you may be in for the fight of your life. But unfortunately, while disabled, when you are most vulnerable, is the worst time to mount a fight against the big insurance company. As you read this article, think how you may become better prepared to deal with this potential problem.
"

Primer on ERISA for attorneys

Good article for attorneys wishing to practice in this area of law.
 

Use discovery as a tool to expose the procedure through which insurance companies deny claims

From . This is the defense attorney view of the current situation.
Our view is that plaintiffs should aggressively try to push for discovery and make the bad faith insurance company accountable for its decisions.

Although the cases seem to be fractured between and within the various federal
jurisdictions, certain general principles can nonetheless be derived from them.
First, after Glenn it is no longer the case that defendants can oppose all discovery in
ERISA benefits actions. There is authority in all federal jurisdictions that after Glenn,
plaintiffs are able to engage in some discovery, at least insofar as it relates to the
scope and discovery of any financial conflict of interest.
Second, many courts have made clear that discovery beyond the administrative
record should be narrowly limited to the issue of bias and self-interest,
although some have allowed free-ranging discovery. The common kinds of facts that courts have
permitted discovery on include (1) statistical information about the frequency of denials, (2) information about the use of medical consultants and other experts, (3) the financial incentive claim administrators
may have for deciding claims, and (4) efforts by the employer or insurer to
“wall off” decision-makers from having any financial stake in the outcome of a benefit
decision. Third, some courts appear willing to consider procedures to circumvent the need to engage immediately in discovery. For example, as illustrated by Greasey, courts might be persuaded to adopt a procedure by which they would initially review the administrative record to determine if they can decide whether or not the benefit decision was arbitrary and capricious without regard to considering the conflict of
interest. A claim denial might be so clearly supported and substantiated in the record
(or so clearly unsupported and unsubstantiated)
that it obviously is, or obviously is not, arbitrary and capricious. Only if the answer
to that threshold question is “no” would the parties then be put to the burden and expense
of engaging in discovery regarding the purported conflict of interest, its scope and extent, and whether it affected the decision. That, as explained in Greasey, would better serve ERISA’s fundamental goal of providing an expedient, inexpensive and expeditious method for reviewing claims. That approach also has authority from other courts, such as the Sixth Circuit in Kramer and the Third Circuit in Feigenbaum, which found it unnecessary to consider whether discovery was permissible in light of the fact that the denial
of benefits was obviously arbitrary and capricious given the medical evidence establishing
disability. Fourth, defendants opposing plaintiffs’ efforts to widen discovery should carefully distinguish merits discovery (which is generally disallowed) from discovery into the impact the conflict of interest may have had
on the benefit decision. Lastly, although it may not be possible to limit all discovery, it may be possible to minimize the amount if administrators adopt and implement procedures during the time of claim administration. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed in Denmark, after Glenn administrators should be expected to put in the administrative record express evidence of the measures taken to reduce bias stemming from any conflict of interest, and to provide evidence in each administrative record of the measures implemented. For example, claims administrators should include in administrative records signed or verified
certifications attesting to the fact that they derive no financial benefit from the denial of claims, that they are not subject to any bonus or incentive programs, that they incur no penalty as the result of any benefit decision, and similar issues that Glenn, and to a lesser extent Denmark, identified. In addition, claims administrators might
Discovery After Glenn  page 48 also include such material with respect to any third-party administrators upon whose input claims decisions are based, such as the numbers of claims referred to third
parties for review, compensation rates, and any of the other kinds of material for which courts have recently permitted discovery in ERISA benefits cases. Although such measures cannot guarantee that courts will not permit discovery into them once litigation has begun, it is relatively clear that without that kind of material in the administrative record, courts will continue to permit
such discovery.

Ninth circuit - the most liberal of all?

From the article:
"The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Burke v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 554 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), that even before Glenn, in the
Ninth Circuit a district court could always “‘consider evidence outside the administrative record to decide the nature, extent, and effect on the decision-making process of any conflict of interest’

Plaintiffs suing under Ninth Circuit are somewhat lucky to have more liberal court permitting discovery on the bad faith insurance companies.

Views of the opposing counsel

It is always useful to understand the viewpoint of the opposing counsel.
DRI - that claims itself to be the "Voice of the Defense Bar" is one such organization.
According to the article at
"The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) promised to establish a nationally uniform, inexpensive and efficient way to adjudicate and review plan participants’ benefit claims, and to encourage employers to adopt pension and employee welfare benefit plans. According to the United States Supreme Court, ERISA has the “policy of inducing employers to employers or insurance companies) who both decide and pay claims operate under an inherent conflict of interest and, if the plan vests discretion to the administrator, a reviewing court must consider that conflict in deciding if a claim has been denied arbitrarily and capriciously. Although that holding was not a great departure from the law of most federal circuits, language in Glenn opened the door to potentially significant, costly and time-consuming discovery in ERISA litigation that most, if not all, circuits had previously barred. Moreover,
the lower courts’ application of that aspect of Glenn has been far from uniform, leaving
defendants in ERISA benefits actions subject to a wide variety of rules, principles,
and different expectations about the extent of permissible discovery depending on the jurisdiction in which suit is filed.

This article briefly describes how the various circuit courts of appeal—and district courts within those circuits—have applied Glenn with respect to discovery offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation occurs."


While the objectives are noble, one should note that implementation has been faulty, to say the least. There are plenty of stories which detail how insurance companies have misused the regulations in the guise of the law. At this blog, we will continue to detail such stories and help promote awareness among the general population of  the pitfalls of this regulation.